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INTERNATIONAL NEWS SER VICE v ASSOCIA TED PRESS:
CUSTOM AND LAW AS SOURCES OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN NEWS
Richard A. Epstein
I.

THE ORIGINS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

7fHE

origin of property rights has long been a source of controX
y both within the law and beyond it. On the one hand there
are those who see the source of property rights in the positive law. In
line with the theories of John Austin,1 law is regarded as a command
of the sovereign, and knowledge of property rights derives from
understanding what the sovereign, through his courts, has decreed to
be recognized and protected as property rights.2
In opposition to Austin stands an alternative view that grounds
property rights on the traditions and common practices within a given
community.3 On this view, property comes from the bottom up, and
not from the top down. In other words, the state does not hand down
the law or create property rights, any more than it decrees the laws of
physics or chemistry. Its chief function is to discover and reflect
accurately what the community has customarily regarded as binding
social rules and then to enforce those rules in specific controversies.
The image in this context is not of courts-or even legislatures-that
"make" the law, but rather of courts and legislatures that "find" and
respect the law, which they then refine by incremental changes and
marginal decisions.
One reason why the controversy between these two positions is so
hard to resolve is that each has advantages over the other. Reliance
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I
would like to thank Douglas Baird and William Landes for their insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article.
I See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), reprinted in The

Province of Jurisprudence 5-6 (Legal Classics Libr. ed. 1984).
2 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 20-25 (1961); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 312
(C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
3 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 254 (1991);
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J Hoope. The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Torts, 21 J. Legal Stud. 3 (1992).
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upon customary practices reduces many of the problems of knowledge
for the legal system. Once custom is accepted as controlling, it is no
longer necessary for judges to guess what set of rules best accommodate the communities they serve. That information is generated by
trial and error from below, and those practices that survive have good
claim to being beneficial (one could almost say efficient or wealthmaximizing) for the community at large. If, for example, one wants
to figure out the optimal ownership rules over whales, it is unnecessary to resort to abstract principles of legal title or social justice. One
can simply observe the multiplicity of practices in different whaling
environments, each appropriate for its different kind of whale.4 In
some instances, there may be a single owner of the whale, and in
others, ownership of the whale may be divided. So long as the separate sphere of application for each rule is well-delineated, there is no
reason to formulate a single uniform rule to cover all takers.
In addition, custom provides an effective bulwark against bias and
corruption. The custom is the result of repeated interactions, trial
and error, and incremental modifications, and is formed by persons
who are, of necessity, ignorant of the position they will occupy in any
future dispute. All persons who gain from the use of the custom generally may lose from its application in a particular case. Therefore,
when a dispute arises, the custom effectively binds the litigants, who
now have every incentive to deviate from it. Judges no longer have
the ability or the need to make freewheeling judgments about the
practices of industries with which they have scant connection,
although they must always be alert to the reach and the limit of the
customs they apply.

4

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. described the divergent whaling rules as follows:
In the Greenland whale-fishery, by the English custom, if the first striker lost his hold
on the fish, and it was then killed by another, the first had no claim; but he had the
whole if he kept fast to the whale until it was struck by the other, although it then broke
from the first harpoon. By the custom in the Gallipagos, on the other hand, the first
striker had half the whale, although control of the line was lost. Each of these customs
has been sustained and acted on by the English courts, and Judge Lowell has decided in
accordance with still a third, which gives the whale to the vessel whose iron first
remains in it, provided claim be made before cutting in.

Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881), reprinted in The Common Law & Other
Writings 212 (Legal Classics Libr. ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). These customs were not the

outgrowth of judicial decisions. See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 192.
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Customary rules also may be attacked. One obvious limitation,
accepted even by defenders of customary standards, is that they do
not bind strangers. For example, a custom of factory owners to pollute farms may adjust relations between factory owners, but it surely
cannot bind farmers. Similarly, a custom of slavery does not bind the
slaves. But even within a closed community, customary rules may be
criticized, as they were by Justice Joseph Story, on the ground that
they do not have the regularity, uniformity, or predictability their
supporters claim. As Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice for the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, wrote in The
Reeside :'
I own myself no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late
years, of setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds of
business and trade, to control, vary, or annul the general liabilities of
parties under the common law, as well as under the commercial law.
It has long appeared to me, that there is no small danger in admitting
such loose and inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown to
particular parties, and always liable to great misunderstandings and
misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well-known and wellsettled principles of law.
The implication of Story's observation is that the positive law provides a clear rule of law with a universal frame of application.
Although (in fairness) Story's remarks were made in the context of a
case in which a party to a contract sought to use custom to override
the unambiguous "positive" term of the contract, Story's dictum was
understood to cover not only the commercial law, but the general
principles of the common law as well, where it has received (again in
connection with the whaling trade) a frosty reception. 6
The tradeoff between these two positions should be evident. The
positive law is defended on the grounds of its administrative ease of
application, the customary law on its suitability to the particular cons 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657).

Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696), observing that
[t]he whale fishery is the only branch of industry of any importance in which it [custom]
is likely to be much used; and if a usage is found to prevail generally in that business, it
will not be open to the objection that it is likely to disturb the general understanding of
mankind by the interposition of an arbitrary exception.
Note that Story clearly is correct when he notes that explicit terms of a contract take precedence over an industry custom, for custom is best understood as setting out the "right" default
provisions, not as creating a body of mandatory terms.
6 See
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text in which it arises. There is no necessary truth that says that the
one feature should dominate the other, and it is quite possible to find
contexts in which the custom does (or should) prevail and others in
which quite the opposite prevails.
Most people have little difficulty in understanding how the legal
system works when law functions as a command. The command
issues forth from the state, which has a monopoly on the lawful use of
force within the state. Compliance, therefore, is required of all individuals and is secured, in turn, by administrative and legal personnel
working in strict hierarchical order.
The origin of custom, however, is a greater mystery. In this context, the central question arises: How can any social system achieve
through evolution a spontaneous order that offers the stability necessary for a system of property rights to thrive? The process of spontaneous evolution is, at root, regarded as a benevolent collective
process, even though it lacks a system of central coordination and
control. Legal recognition of the rule is not a conscious act of innovation by the judge who first voices it on the legal record. Rather, the
judicial decision, and the reasoning that underlies it, offers only an
outside observer's account of a preexisting set of social understandings whose validity is asserted and defended only when it becomes the
subject of special attack in the courts.
Indeed, at some level, the process is even more general. Countless
societies have developed over the centuries complex systems of property rights to govern all sorts of resources and situations. In most of
these cases, the property rights that emerged were not the result of
any conscious effort on the part of a central planning agency to delineate the relevant rights. Indeed, in many cases it looks as though the
property rights that emerged within a given community were both
created and maintained by a form of custom that received, in inchoate
form, the general approbation and approval of all the parties within
the group. The results of this process of customary accretion and
development have largely been beneficial to the societies that have
adopted them, sometimes even better than the elaborate systems of
property rights that central planners have created. It is possible to be
excessive in the celebration of the evolution of the common law of
customary property rights, but there is a good deal to be said for the
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process of "spontaneous order," as first foreshadowed by David
Hume7 and as ultimately championed by Friedrich Hayek.'
Yet there are some puzzling features to this account. The very
decentralization of the process suggests that the property rights that
develop in such a system, if any, should become prey to the process of
destruction whenever any single player defects from the rules of the
game as it is normally played. For once one party deviates from the
customary rule of behavior, playing by the rules yields a lower rate of
return for other persons who stay within the system, who then have a
greater incentive to defect from the system. As one player can foresee
that others will defect, the temptation to obtain the gains of the first
defector should be very great, so that someone will leave first, leaving
all the more reason for others quickly to follow suit. Of course, once
the rights become partial or fragmentary, they cease to be property
rights, at least in the sense of rights good against the rest of the world,
though the notion of rights good against the rest of the world is itself
subject to important qualification. 9 The corrosive logic of the prisoners' dilemma game appears to imply the absence of stable customary
regimes, whether in the area of water rights or hunting territories.10
Nonetheless, we encounter systems of property rights that do, in
fact, endure and are understood even before the courts become
involved in the process of their delineation and protection, although
admittedly the phenomenon need not be a universal one. In essence,
the puzzle that has to be solved is not why A or B defects first, but
how custom survives long enough for a stable rule to emerge from
which any defections are possible at all. In this Article, I shall look at
one system of property rights whose contours are very difficult to
understand and evaluate-the system of property rights in "news."
7

See III David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 407 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1965)

(1888).
s See Friedrich A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History
of Ideas (1978); Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973). See generally John
Gray, Hayek On Liberty 31-33 (2d ed. 1986) (exploring the relationship between Hayek's idea
of spontaneous order and the Darwinian notion of natural selection). In essence, Hayek sees a

powerful role for customary forces that lie between pure instinct on the one hand and
centralized planning on the other. See id. at 29. The connection between Hume and Hayek is
duly noted by Gray. Id. at 31.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 71-82.
10See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711 (1986).
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The central case is, of course, the justly celebrated decision of the
United States Supreme Court in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press n1 ("INS"). The discussion calls for an inquiry into both
the particular circumstances of the case and the more general system
of property fights surrounding it.
In Part II, I look at the case as dealing with the origins of property
rights in custom and common practice. In Part III, I examine the
case in light of the general principles of property at common law,
namely those that give property to whomever takes first possession of
a thing, and ask how, if at all, these principles carry over into the field
of property rights in information, especially news. The final Part then
offers some more general remarks about the dual aspect of property
rights and the tensions that they create for any legal system.

II. INS AS CUSTOM
A.

The INS Case-in Context

For the purposes of this Article, it is useful first to state the traditional account of the facts. 12 The Associated Press ("AP") was incorporated under New York law in 1900. It had about 950 members
who were bound by an elaborate set of contractual understandings
with each other. The central mission of the AP was to collect news
from around the world and to distribute that news in timely fashion to
each of its member papers. Under its internal rules, the AP transferred to each of its members news reports for publication, language
and location specified in the certificate of membership. The bylaws of
the organization specified that no member newspaper, nor any of its
employees, was allowed to transfer the news reports or the information contained therein to any person or organization not a member of
the organization. In addition, the bylaws required each member
newspaper to collect news from its region and transmit it to the AP
for use by all of its members. Although later invalidated in part on
antitrust grounds,13 the AP's bylaws allowed old members unilaterally to bar their competitors from Al membership unless overruled
11248 U.S. 215 (1918).
12

For more detailed accounts of the business structures of both firms, see id. at 229-31;

Associated Press v. International News Serv., 240 F. 983, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 245 F.
244 (2d Cir. 1917), afl'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ("Associated P-ess P').
13 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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by a vote of four-fifths of the membership. 14 During the year 1915,
the AP spent $3,500,000 for the collection of news.
The International News Service ("INS") was organized as a stock
corporation under New Jersey law in 1909. The Hearst Newspapers
dominated the INS. The INS was about half the size of the AP, with
a membership roster of about 400 newspapers and an annual expenditure on news of around $2,000,000 during 1915. Notwithstanding the
difference in corporate structure from the AP, the INS also gathered
news and information that it then sold to its customers and clients.
For both organizations, the rules regarding the collection and dissemination of news were drafted with the explicit knowledge that the
value of the news to the members depended upon their exclusive ability to get it to their respective markets as quickly as possible. It was
clear that the two organizations were in keen competition with each
other in the collection and distribution of their stories, as were many
of the papers that subscribed to the two services. There was minimal
overlap in the membership of the two groups.
When the case was in the lower courts, two business practices of
the INS were in issue. First, in order to obtain some information
from AP sources, the INS had bribed employees of the newspapers in
the AP circle to provide the INS with copies of the stories before they
were printed, thereby inducing AP member newspapers to violate
their internal bylaws. Second, the INS had taken AP stories as they
appeared on bulletin boards and in the early eastern editions of AP
papers and had fed those stories verbatim to INS papers. In so doing,
the INS did not acknowledge the source of its own information, but
by the same token, it did not explicitly claim that it had produced the
news stories. It just treated them as stories collected in the ordinary
course of its business, leaving it to its member papers and readers to
draw an inference from the silence, if they cared to think about the
point at all, that the INS had, in fact, collected these stories in the
ordinary course of its business.
It appears that this last set of practices was precipitated by a controversy that arose when the INS (controlled by the Hearst papers)
14 Id. at 10; see also INS, 248 U.S. at 264 n. 1 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing, in
general terms, provisions of AP bylaws pertaining to admittance of new members). In
contrast, newspapers that did not compete with AP members could be admitted by simple vote
of the board of directors. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 9.
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had taken positions that were strongly sympathetic to the German
cause in the First World War. In retaliation, the British and French
authorities cut INS personnel off from the front lines and barred them
from using the entire European cable system. 5 The upshot was that
the INS could not readily supply stories about the war in Europe to
its subscribers within the demanding time constraints of the news
business. In some cases at least, the INS had used AP sources for its
own stories, and the AP complaint alleged that the practice was a
16
consistent and ongoing one.
During the course of the litigation below, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined the bribes and
the inducement.17 Although it thought that using AP stories verbatim without attribution constituted an unfair trade practice, it refused
to enjoin the practice, given that the case was one of "first impression.'"" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

affirmed the District Court's first two holdings but reversed the denial
of the injunction against verbatim use without attribution. 9 The
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Mahlon Pitney, affirmed in
an elaborate opinion, recognizing the "quasi-property" interest that
the AP had in its news stories while they were still "fresh," at least
against its direct competitor, the INS."°
15 According to the testimony in the case:

[O]n October 10, 1916, the International News Service was forbidden by an Act of the
British Government from securing any news in Great Britain, or from using any of the
cable lines running from Great Britain. On November 8, 1916, a like prohibition was
established in France. [Similar prohibitions were imposed in Canada, Japan and
Portugal.] From and after these dates it was not possible for the International News
Service to obtain or receive news by telegraph or cable from any of the countries
indicated, and yet day by day it has regularly sent out news to its clients as if received
from these countries by the cables connecting them with the United States.
Deposition of Melville E. Stone at 24, INS (No. 221); see also INS, 248 U.S. at 263 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (describing the same). Justice Louis Brandeis treated the point as an allegation,
see id., but the district court found that "the Allies have deprived the defendant of the right to
use their cables, and thus get news readily in the countries of Europe." AssociatedPressI, 240
F. at 986-87.
16 Complaint of the Associated Press at 14-15, INS (No. 221).
17 Associated Press I, 240 F. at 987-90.
1 Id. at 996.

19 Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244 (2d Cir. 1917), aff'd, 248 U.S.
215 (1918) ("Associated Press IT').
20 INS, 248 U.S. at 215. In my view, Justice Pitney is the most underrated justice in the
history of the Court. It is worth mentioning just a couple of the important decisions that he
wrote: Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (holding that gain realized from common
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In many ways, the decision is quite extraordinary. One can search
the length and breadth of Pitney's opinion for some mention of the
special circumstances that led the INS to "steal" ("misappropriate" is
the polite word) the stories that the AP had prepared at its own
expense. Only Justice Louis Brandeis refers to these facts, and then

toward the end of his opinion. His purpose, moreover, is not to
explain their relevance to a theory of customary rights, but to justify
his broader conclusion that legislatures, and not courts, should take
the lead in creating property rights in news.z" Yet that change in
external circumstances is critical both to the narrative behind the case
and to its proper legal analysis: Barring one news service from the
front will lead to the creation of a monopoly when its competitors are
allowed continued access to the front. More concretely, neither
Pitney, Oliver Wendell Holmes in his undistinguished partial concur-

rence, nor Brandeis in dissent inquire about a raft of issues that are
critical for understanding the broader institutional context of the case.
Let me note some of them here:
(1) Although the INS misappropriated AP stories from the bulletin boards and early newspapers in this case, did it ever do so on any

other occasion or for any other reason? The point bears special
recounting because it was evident that these two titans of the news
world had been in competition with each other for several years
before the INS pirating actually took place.2 " At all times, then, the
stock dividends must be recognized at the time of disposition, not the time of receipt, of the
stock); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (upholding inducement of
breach of contract claims against unions); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking
down collective bargaining on the railroads). For these purposes, the question is not whether
one agrees with Pitney, as I tend to do. It is that he clearly battles both Holmes and Brandeis
as their intellectual equal, as is surely the case in INS.
21 Justice Brandeis described the INS's predicament as follows:
A large majority of the newspapers and perhaps half the newspaper readers of the
United States are dependent for their news of general interest upon agencies other than
the Associated Press. The channel through which about 400 of these papers received, as
the plaintiff alleges, "a large amount of news relating to the European war of the
greatest importance and of intense interest to the newspaper reading public" was
suddenly closed. The closing to the International News Service of these channels for
foreign news (if they were closed) was due not to unwillingness on its part to pay the
cost of collecting the news, but to the prohibitions imposed by foreign governments
upon its securing news from their respective countries and from using cable or telegraph
lines running therefrom.
INS, 248 U.S. at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22 See Complaint of the Associated Press at 12, INS (No. 221).
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INS had the opportunity to take information from AP bulletin boards
or from the early editions of AP member papers. Did it do so? Why?
(2) When the INS did misappropriate stories from the AP's bulletin boards and the early editions, did it do so only for the stories pertaining to the events in the European theater from which it had been
barred? For all other stories, did the INS continue to rely upon the
information that it had gathered by its own labor, without misappropriating AP stories or sources? Note that it was no more difficult for
the INS to take these other stories than it was for it to take the stories
that related to the front.
(3) Did the AP at any time take INS stories? It doubtless had
ample opportunities to do so, given that the INS employed roughly
the same technology, and it might even have regarded retaliation
against the INS as a desirable form of self-help. If the AP did not
take INS stories, why did the AP, in an area of law that was
uncharted and full of pitfalls, decide to seek an injunction in court,
one which sought to analogize the misappropriation of the news stories to the bribery and inducement counts in the case?
(4) Were there any new entrants into the news business that sought
to gather information solely by stealing stories from either the AP or
the INS (or both)? And did any newspaper steal the information for
its own use or for resale from either source?
B. Lifting Stories and Following Tips: The Judicial
Response to Custom
All of these questions raise a common theme: To what extent can
one say that there was, by custom and common practice, a system of
property rights at work with respect to news stories? If the positivist
account of the law is correct, we should expect to see a massive problem of instability in the absence of any clear statutory or common law
declaration of property rights in this area. Nonetheless, although the
record is not as clear on these points as one would hope, it appears on
balance that, in general, the situation was as follows: Apart from the
cases of bribery and inducement of breach of confidence, which were
reasonably limited affairs, the practice of taking stories from bulletin
boards or from earlier editions of newspapers was uncommon, even
though it was not clearly prohibited by statute or judicial decision. It
was only when the British and French authorities cut the INS off
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from the front that it appropriated AP stories.23 In dealing with the
historical aspects of the case, therefore, the hard question is not why
the INS chose to use AP stories. Rather, it is why the taking was so
long in coming.
In order to understand that question, one has to return to Hayek's
central theme and ask whether it is possible, within the context of
property rights in news, to develop some spontaneous order among
the players that will coordinate effectively their competitive activities.
In this case, the evidence does not all cut in one direction, but it at
least suggests that, in some contexts, orders of this sort can emerge
without the central control and compulsion of the state. In fact,
wholly, or at least largely, without regard to systems of legal enforcement, there was a stable system of customary property rights in news
that the competing newspapers respected and clear conventions as to
the actions that each party could take with respect to its competitors.2 4 Then the dam broke. An adequate theory of the case, or, more
accurately, the social behavior exhibited in the case, requires that we
simultaneously take into account both features-stability and
breakdown.
The first point in the analysis is to ask what would have happened
if, as a general matter, the news-gathering practices had been otherwise, so that all comers had a perfect right to publish any news once it
was first published in any form. The judges, generally sympathetic to
the position of the AP, well understood the totally destructive nature
of the resulting social equilibrium. An example of this judicial attitude is National Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph
23 See supra notes 15 & 21.
24 Indeed, the scope of the custom need not be limited to news associations that do business
in international markets. Throughout the period, it was common to have many local
newspapers publish in either morning or afternoon markets. There were ample opportunities
to misappropriate stories, yet it appears that there was, and is, within the newspaper profession
a powerful norm that tracks that which INS articulated: It is acceptable to follow leads from
other papers, but not to lift their stories bodily. See INS, 248 U.S. at 242-43. There appears to
be little variation in the norm, or doubt as to its efficacy. Interview with Donna Leff, Professor
of Journalism, The Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University, in Chicago, Ill.
(Oct. 1990) (stating categorically that any expert in journalism would testify without
contradiction to the strength of that custom today throughout the newspaper business). At the
conference at which this Article was originally presented, Professor Edmund Kitch noted that
when he was a cub reporter years ago, his initial assignment was to track down leads from
stories collected overnight from rival papers. The stories themselves were never used without
independent verification.
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256
Co., a case Justice
Pitney relied on in INS.2 6 National Telegraph
had sent its agents over to offices of Western Union's clients to collect
the information that Western Union had received and had distributed
to its own customers. The case, it is important to note, is distinguishable from INS in that the information in National Telegraph was
gleaned not from public bulletins or early editions of eastern newspapers, but from the displays in the offices of Western Union's patrons,
who were bound by contract not to reproduce the information for
further distribution. 27 Nonetheless, Judge Peter Grosscup's discussion of the effect of allowing the system of reproduction to continue
without legal hindrance reveals the broader issues that lurk behind
the legal rule:

It is obvious, also, that if appellants may lawfully appropriate the
product thus expensively put upon the appellee's tape, and distribute
the same instantaneously to their own patrons, as their own product,
thus escaping any expense of collection, but one result could followthe gathering and distributing of news, as a business enterprise, would
cease altogether. Appellee could not, in the nature of things, procure
copyright under the Act of Congress upon its printed tape; and it
could not, against such unfair conditions, without some measure of
protection, compete with appellants upon prices to be charged their
respective patrons. And in the withdrawal of appellee from this business, there would come death to the business of appellants as well; for
without the use of appellee's tape, appellants would have nothing to
distribute. The parasite that killed, would itself be killed, and the
public would be left without any service at any price.2 8
With this statement, Judge Grosscup counts as one of the inadvertent founders of modern game theory.2 9 In effect, he describes (with
25 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902).

26 See INS, 248 U.S. at 237-38. Justice Brandeis, in contrast, gave National Telegraph a
back-of-the-hand treatment, citing it along with ten other cases. Brandeis argued that the case
stands only for the proposition that information acquired in confidence under contract or trust
cannot be passed further on, a point discussed infra Part III.B.2. He acknowledged, however,
that although these cases "can, on their facts, be reconciled with this principle,... much of the
language of the courts cannot be." Id. at 252 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

27 National Telegraph, 119 F. at 295-96.
28 Id. at 296.

29 "Game theory can be described as the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers." Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory:
The Analysis of Conflict 1 (1990). The typical game involves two or more players who must
choose among alternative strategies in order to maximize their anticipated payoffs.
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an accurate evolutionary analogue) the situation as it would exist if
the appropriation of the stories prepared by others were allowed as a
matter of course. The parasite can take only what has been produced,
and if there is no production, there can be no theft. What holds in
biological settings, he observes, holds in commercial ones as well: no
service, and, correspondingly, no gains for any relevant parties. In
contrast, granting the injunction (and enforcing the contracts) would
permit Western Union to gain its return. It also would allow
National Telegraph to enter the market and obtain a competitive
return for itself, thereby benefiting the public by facilitating a competitive system of quotations. It is clearly a Pareto-superior deal (that is,
one that makes one of the parties, National Telegraph, better off without harming the other, Western Union), at least if the administrative
cost of enforcing the contract rights is low, which it assuredly is.
At one level, however, Judge Grosscup is wrong. It need not follow
that the equilibrium position without the legal injunction will yield no
output. That occurs only if there is no private return that Western
Union could make from its ticker tape services. Even without property rights in its ticker tape messages, Western Union still might have
other advantages from being the first provider of the information that
would allow it to continue its operations, albeit on a reduced scale,
even after pirating. Western Union also could shift its methods of
distribution (by installing tickers only in secured central locations) in
an effort to reduce the free riding. Nevertheless, the power of Judge
Grosscup's rhetoric does not depend upon the certainty that the corner solution (no output) will be obtained. As a social matter, the
injunction is fully warranted if the unrestrained state of affairs leads
to a suboptimal collection of the relevant information. The partial
destruction of the use of the ticker tapes seems large enough to warrant the protection against the threatened misappropriation.
Empirically, the dominance of the "no misappropriation" solution
helps explain why the AP and the INS did not engage early on in
systematic appropriation. In fact, there developed an industry custom
(as opposed to a conscious agreement), in which all wire services
joined, not to use information from rivals' bulletin boards or early
editions. On this point, the position taken in the AP's brief is
unequivocal:
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Upon this point it is essential to notice the clear and vital distinction between the two kinds of use to which news taken from newspapers may be put.
1. The one use is to send out a story based in whole or in part
upon the news obtained from the newspaper without independent
investigation or expense. This use may include the sending of a bare
statement of the fact of the event, or a more extended copy of the
details of the story of the rival news agency. This is the use practiced
by the defendant which the complainant seeks to enjoin. This practice has never been recognized as fair or proper among news agencies
or newspapers and has never been adopted or authorized by the complainant as the District Court found....
2. The other use is to obtain the mere information that a reported
event has happened. Upon receipt of this information or rumor the
news agency then proceeds, not to verify the news, but to obtain the
news by its own independent investigation from the original sources
at its own expense and the only story sent out is based solely upon the
strength of such investigation. This is the practice which complainant admits in the past and which it has been and still is willing that
defendant should employ.3"
One might question whether this distinction between lifting stories
and tracking down tips, drawn as it was from customary practice,
makes sense in the world of commerce. When the case was decided in
the District Court, Judge Augustus Hand-writing as an outsider to
the trade-seemed to take the position that it did not, noting
that the original news is ex hypothesi the product of the labor and
capital of him who gathers it, and whether it be treated as a mere
"tip" for further investigation, or as an authentic and final report, it
cannot be used by a rival news agency without depriving the gatherer
of the very thing which is of value to him, namely, the power to control the sale of the news he has gathered until sufficient time has
elapsed to enable it to be published by all the newspapers he supplies.
Moreover, there is something rather grotesque in going through the
form of verifying a tip, no matter how authentic it may be. In many
cases the verification with modem telephonic communication would
be so rapid that the time required for it would in no sense protect the
original gatherer of the news. I cannot but feel that this matter of
independent investigation is rather a question of business policy, for
30 Brief for Respondent at 65, 67, INS (No. 221). Judge Hand adopted this version of the
facts in his opinion. See Associated Press 1, 240 F. at 991.
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the news31service that receives the tip, than of substantive law or fair
dealing.
For Hand, therefore, the bottom line is that firms may chose to
observe this self-imposed constraint (though, under his analysis, why
they should do so unilaterally is a mystery), and that common business practice appears to be completely severed from any legal or social
constraints on that practice.
Judge Hand, however, does not consistently maintain the radical
severance between social practice and legal rule. Later in his opinion,
Hand is forced to return to the AP's custom-based distinction to
answer the INS's contention that the "unclean hands" doctrine precluded the AP from obtaining injunctive relief, given its concession
that its agents had engaged in the practice of tracking down tips
obtained in other papers. Hand writes:
Nor can it in my opinion be said that the complainant is barred from
asserting its rights in this case after publication, because it has acted
inequitably in making use of "tips" received from the defendant.
Both parties have in this respect acted in substantial accordance with
common business practice, and under the belief that their conduct
was technically lawful. Under such circumstances neither should be

debarred from asserting its legal right and obtaining the protection of
a court of equity, but a court of equity should only enforce 3this
right
2
if the other party to the suit is awarded similar protection.
In the course of these two paragraphs, Hand exhibits widely divergent attitudes toward the question of industry custom. In the first
passage, he belittles the AP's distinction and, in essence, sets up his
own sense of the soundness of the practice to undercut the distinction
between lifting stories and tracking down tips. His evidence is very
much of the armchair variety and assumes that a simple telephone
call will do the business, which in some cases it might, although in
many others it will not (after all, phone calls are sometimes not
returned). In the second passage, however, he returns to the very distinction that he rejected earlier, holding that the AP was entitled to
an injunction against the lifting of its stories so long as it agreed to
accept a similar limitation upon its own conduct, which it previously
had announced it would.
31 Associated Press I, 240 F. at 991.
32 Id. at 995.
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Judge Hand's odd process of reasoning shows how it is possible to
make multiple errors in judgment, which have the beneficial effect of
canceling themselves out in the end. Against the received wisdom
within the industry, he initially sets up his own empirical hunch about
the burdens of following up tips. Almost as a matter of judicial
notice, he regards the cost as small and hence the distinction as providing less property protection than the AP should have sought. But
on such questions of relative costs, the Hayekian insight that the local
information obtained by the players in the industry is far more reli3
able than the inferences that outsiders draw from general principles,
surely should be followed. Yet, oddly enough, the local custom does
prevail when the dust settles, for, in structuring his legal rule, Hand
refuses to treat all use of a rival's stories as equally improper, even
though he could not have distinguished between them. Rather, he
makes it clear that he would have refused, if asked, to enjoin tracking
down tips because both sides engage in it, but he did enjoin lifting
information so that neither side would engage in it.3 4 In essence, he
sanctions the creation of a property rights regime on the basis of
industry custom that rests upon the very distinction that he had dismissed a few pages before as unintelligible.
Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court took a more
favorable attitude toward the distinction. The Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Charles Hough, held explicitly that "[tihere is no
difficulty in discriminating between the utilization of 'tips' and the
bodily appropriation of another's labor in accumulating and stating

33 John Gray describes the Hayekian approach as follows:
For Hayek is at great pains to point out that the dispersed knowledge which brings
about a tendency to equilibrium in economic life and so facilitates an integration of
different plans of life, is precisely not theoretical or technical knowledge, but practical

knowledge of concrete situations--"knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of
special circumstances." As Hayek puts it: "The skipper who earns his living from using
otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose
whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the
arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices-are all performing
eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting

moment not known to others."
Gray, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in
Individualism and Economic Order 77, 80 (1948)). The constant references to "local," "temporary," and "fleeting" capture the news business to a "T."
34 Associated PressI, 240 F. at 995-96.
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and in the Supreme Court, Justice Pitney, with a bit

more caution, wrote that "[wie are inclined to think a distinction may
be drawn between the utilization of tips and the bodily appropriation
of news matter, either in its original form or after rewriting and without independent investigation and verification."3 6 In both instances, I
think that the appellate courts' instincts were better than Judge
Hand's, but the methodology still was flawed because both Hough
and Pitney relied too heavily on their independent cognitive judgments about the inherent plausibility of the distinction and less upon
the practices within the industry that led to its creation.
C. A Rational-ChoiceExplanationfor a Common Practiceand Its
Breakdown
Although I believe custom and common practice offer reliable
guides to choosing the right set of property rights and liability rules,
we do not have to accept the news-gathering custom on blind faith.
Rather, by looking more closely at its two constituent practices, it is
possible, I think, to give a formal, rational explanation of how they
are able to create a sensible customary structure, one that should
prove stable in most (but perhaps not all) circumstances.
By refraining from wholesale misappropriation of their rivals' stories, the parties can avoid the degenerative social equilibrium that
Judge Grosscup described in NationalTelegraph.3 Each party knows
that the danger of retaliation is so great that once it decides to adopt a
free-rider position, it will, over time, lose its own investment in the
news-gathering business. As repeat players, the newspapers that rely
upon these agencies or constitute their membership or clients also
must fear the destruction of their sources of information, which constitutes a powerful incentive to respect the customary rules in their
ordinary business. The newspaper that tried to rely solely on renegade sources for its news stories would have, at best, an intermittent
and unreliable source of information and would be outside the pale of
respectable society in its news-gathering practices. A strong dose of
35 Associated Press II, 245 F. at 247.
36 INS, 248 U.S. at 243-44.
37 For further discussion of the preconditions for the emergence of custom, with special
reference to the law of tort, see Epstein, supra note 3, at 12-17.
38 For a quotation of the relevant discussion, see supra text accompanying note 28.
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community self-survival and individual self-interest thus should help
to preserve the basic overall equilibrium.
We can account similarly for the second part of the practice-the
use of tips from other news agencies. This practice does not pose a
threat to the overall stability of the enterprise comparable to lifting
stories. So long as there is independent investigation of the tip, and so
long as the information printed in the story is obtained through that
investigation, a firm will be able to take advantage of the tips only if it
already has an extensive news collection agency in place. Within this
framework, using tips across the board allows all the papers to lower
their cost of collecting information, without destroying the initial
incentive to produce information in the first place. Thus, if the
independent investigation takes any time at all, then the original producer of the information still preserves an important part of its temporal advantage over its rival.
Because the practice of following these tips is acknowledged to be
universal, it does not confer any obvious distributional benefit on one
firm over another. Quite the opposite, following tips enables all of the
players to lower their costs, which benefits the overall marketplace,
including the consumers who will enjoy superior access to news. In
effect, by using tips, each side gets implicit in-kind compensation from
the exception to the basic norm against the misappropriation of
others' stories.
The interaction of these two customary practices, therefore, seems
to have powerful efficiency benefits for the operation of the industry as
a whole. The argument, of course, depends upon the level of cost
differences between lifting stories bodily and tracking down tips. It
also depends upon a perception that self-interest is so strong, and
monitoring so difficult, that no norm that forbade the use of tips could
ever survive. There may well be more at stake than this outsider's
view of the industry can detect, but, for present purposes, the persistence of the distinction between following tips and lifting stories made
and adhered to within the trade, both at the time of INS and now,
provides the best evidence that this distinction is substantial enough
to count.
D. The Analogy of Self-Enforcing Contracts
In dealing with this two-part custom, there is an instructive analogy to the logic of self-enforcing contracts in the context of ordinary
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exchange transactions. In a world in which there are only one-shot
exchanges, we should not expect to see self-enforcing contracts except
in those cases in which the exchange is simultaneous, itself a highly
restrictive condition to satisfy because someone must hand over something first.3 9 The party that performs first has, in essence, surrendered
a thing in exchange for a promise that is worthless if not kept. It is a
promise that a self-interested promisor will not keep voluntarily, for
he is better off keeping both the money and the thing. The entire logic
for accepting the Hobbesian sovereign rests on the party's ability to
make sure that the second half of the voluntary exchange will take
place once the first is completed, for if it does not, then the first part of
the exchange will not take place at all. °
The introduction of repeat transactions, however, changes the strategies for the individual players. The probability of entering into gainful exchanges in the future normally has a positive value to both
players. As rational actors, these players have to take into account
these inchoate relational gains along with the gains or losses that they
may incur on the immediate transaction. If X parts with a thing
worth $100 on the strength of F's promise to pay X $100, Y will not
keep both the thing and the money if the value of future dealings with
Xis worth over $100 to Y. In this situation, if Y decides to keep both
the thing and the money, Y's short-term act of self-interest leaves X
with no other choice but to refuse to go first in other exchanges with
Y, so X, having lost the thing, has nothing to gain from keeping alive
a relationship that promises her only a string of future losses. Y is left
worse off as well because the $100 gained is smaller than the future
profits from continuing his trading relationship with X. There is,
39 Indeed, the whole practice of escrows and brokers arises to introduce long-term repeat
third-party players when exchanges cannot be simultaneous.
40 See Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 583 (1990). Even in the absence of the Hobbesian sovereign, as Anthony
Kronman demonstrated, the parties can adopt certain strategies to bind themselves to forward
contracts without legal enforcement, such as the giving of hostages, or the tailoring of specific
goods to the needs of the other party, so that its value in alternative use is destroyed although
its value in exchange is preserved. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of
Nature, I J.L., Econ. & Organizations 5 (1985). Note that there is no reason why the legal and
nonlegal remedies should be thought of as mutually exclusive. If the nonlegal devices are able
to reduce the likelihood or severity of breach, then the legal sanctions, even if costly and
imperfect in themselves, may be strong enough to allow the overall system of exchange to go
forward.
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then, a stable relationship between X and Y, even if there is no legal
enforcement of any discrete exchange transaction.
The point can be generalized. The secret for preserving self-enforcing exchanges is to make sure that the property or money that is
transferred from one side to the other is always worth less to the
recipient than his or her continued maintenance of the exchange relationship. From this basic point, three conclusions follow. First, selfenforcing contracts have limited efficiency in that the size of the individual transaction cannot become too large in relation to the parties'
valuation of future trades between them. Second, self-enforcing contractual relationships are difficult to maintain for any fixed, limited
period, for, as the end of the relationship comes closer, the anticipated
gains to each side from future trades diminish, which increases the
likelihood that one side will welch if given the opportunity. Third,
any system of self-enforcing exchanges over time runs the risk that
sudden shifts in external circumstances, such as the outbreak of war
or changes in weather conditions or technology, will change radically
the value of the goods or money that are handed over, relative to the
future value of the exchange.
This model of self-enforcing contracts need not be limited to a set
of serial exchanges between two parties. It could well explain the
imperfect durability of customary practices against unilateral defections in other contexts-including the news-gathering business. Even
though there are no direct exchanges between the various agencies,
each of them faces a breach-or-perform choice that is similar to X's
and Y's in the above example. To perform is not to lift a rival's stories; to breach is to do so. In each case, the risk of retaliation is so
great that no player in the business will want to take the first step and
defect.41 Therefore, it will not be in the present long-term interest to
pirate stories because pirating, if too successful, will kill (or radically
transform) the host or lead to retaliation.

41 As an aside, it is clear that individual employees have somewhat greater incentives to
cheat on these relationships because they get all the short-term gains of not complying with the
industry norm, but only a tiny fraction of the losses. It is, therefore, no accident that the AP in
its brief went to great pains to note that any violations of the industry norms were frowned
upon by its senior personnel who took strong measures to counteract them. See Brief for
Respondent at 65, INS (No. 221).
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E.

War and Disequilibrium

The secret of the self-enforcing contract, then, is to ensure that the
short-term gains from defection never exceed the long-term benefits
from preserving general stability. But these short-term gains from
defection may be increased dramatically by events beyond the control
of the parties, which would undermine the apparent permanence of
the overall relationship. Just that happened in INS. Once barred
from the European theater, the INS's private calculations changed
radically. Pirating stories became necessary to keep INS papers in
competition with their AP rivals-without access to the front, no
phone call or investigation could follow up on a tempting lead. Not
having information from the front imposed an enormous short-term
cost on the INS, one sufficient to justify some long-term risk.
Although there may have been sporadic pirating from the time the
INS was formed in 1909,42 the practice of lifting stories probably
started in earnest, as INS policy, only after the British and French
troops barred its reporters from the European theater.
Interestingly, the INS apparently adopted a strategy designed to
allow it to offset its enormous short-term disadvantage without upsetting the entire fabric of the customary system of property rights that
had developed. It seems the INS limited its acts of misappropriation
to those cases in which it lacked direct access to the events underlying
the news. In so doing, it, in essence, adopted as its own working norm
a "necessity" or "just cause" exception to the basic norm, while signaling to the AP its willingness to follow the conventional rules on
news-gathering on all other fronts.
The AP, for its part, chose its strategy with similar restraint. It did
not engage in self-help by stealing stories from the INS in the markets
where the INS still operated, even if it could have used the stories
itself. Nor is there any reason to think that it chose not to use INS
stories solely because it doubted their accuracy: the whole issue of
lifting stories arose precisely because the practice does pay in the
short run. Instead, the AP's studied response is best understood as an
effort to avoid increasing the risks of spreading the destructive equilibrium across the board. The AP could not retaliate in a limited
42 The AP alleged that the INS had lifted stories "[e]ver since the organization of the
defendant," Transcript of Record at 12-13, INS (No. 221), but the actual record shows no

systematic signs of piracy outside of the war context.
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fashion by stealing INS stories from the European theater in good titfor-tat style; therefore, it chose not to retaliate at all but instead
sought injunctive relief through the courts.
The two pieces of the puzzle thus fitted together well. Both sides
sought to partition the difficulties of collecting news from the European theater from the more general question of what rules govern the
acquisition of property rights in news. In this backhanded fashion,
both implicitly acknowledged the system of informal property rights
that had evolved in the news industry without any apparent legal
intervention. Similarly, all other players in the market, having access
to the European theater, continued business as usual. There was thus
a confined local exception to the general rule against lifting stories.
Taking into account the dramatic shifts in access to news on the
European front explains both how the basic legal rule survived as long
as it did, and why it failed when it did. This general account also
gives some sense as to the soundness of the customary rule. When
push came to shove, the legal system adopted the customary rule. In
the next Part, I turn from the custom and practice over information in
news to the formal legal analysis of the topic.

III. INS AS LAW
A.

The FirstPossession Rule

In one sense, the easiest way to defend the result in INS is to recognize the force of custom in the creation of the property rights. Nonetheless, as the case wound its way through the courts, neither of the
parties explicitly argued that property rights should follow the custom
of the industry. Instead, the parties approached the property right
issue as Justice Story did in The Reeside :43 matters of first legal principle had to be brought to bear on the case. Because of this focus on
legal principles rather than on custom, the disruption of the INS's
service was not mentioned at all in Justice Pitney's majority opinion
and was mentioned only in passing in Justice Brandeis' dissent to criticize the rigidity of the Court's ruling.'
In this Part, I will unpack the legal arguments used to defend property rights in news and explain their strengths and weaknesses in deal43 20 F. Cas. 458 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657). For a discussion of Story's positivist
approach, see supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
44 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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ing with the situation in which the AP and the INS found themselves.
The discussion proceeds at a somewhat high level of abstraction, for
the topic is the origin of, and justification for, property rights. Even
with land, the origin of these rights is a "mystery" that no one has
fully been able to unpack, at least to the satisfaction of others. 4 A
fortiori, then, intellectual property, although recognized early on as a
4
species of property, has special difficulties of its own. 6
The best way to proceed in the analysis is to begin with the standard accounts of property rights at common law and to see how they
square with the creation of the property interests in news in INS. My
primary purpose here is not to criticize or to justify the common law
responses. Rather, my main goal is to use the theory of the common
law to gain insight into the peculiar difficulties presented in INS and
subsequent cases.
As is familiar, the single rule for initial acquisition of ownership of
land or chattels at common law is the rule of first possession. That
rule holds that anything in the initial position (that is, something that
no one possesses or owns) is a res nullius-a thing owned by no one.47
The act of possession and occupation takes things from the initial
position and confers upon the first taker the full rights of ownershipthe rights of possession, use, and disposition.48 In general, these own45 See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of

InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411, 413 (1983).
46 As Judge Grosscup reasoned in National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119
F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902):
Property, even as distinguished from property in intellectual production, is not, in its
modern sense, confined to that which may be touched by the hand, or seen by the eye.
What is called tangible property has come to be, in most great enterprises, but the
embodiment, physically, of an underlying life-a life that, in its contribution to success,
is immeasurably more effective than the mere physical embodiment. Such, for example,
are properties built on franchises, on grants of government, on good will, or on trade
names, and the like. It is needless to say, that to every ingredient of property thus made
up-the intangible as well as the tangible, that which is discernible to mind only, as well

as that susceptible to physical touch--equity extends appropriate protection.
Id. at 299.
47 See W.W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 183-84
(3d ed. 1963).
48 See James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries 126 (1980);

see also United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (noting that the
concept of property denotes a person's relation to the possession, use, and disposal of a
physical thing).
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ership rights are infinite in their duration-in sharp contrast to the
very short periods of temporal ownership of news claimed in INS.49
There is, of course, an enormous dispute over the possible justifications for the common law rule of first possession. One highly influential justification is John Locke's so-called "labor theory" of
property." In essence, the theory provides that those persons who
have "mixed" their labor with what nature has provided have earned
the right to treat the things so acquired as their own.5 The labor
theory of ownership has been defended on the grounds that it protects
persons in their labor and gives them proper incentives to improve
and to develop the property in question.52 There are many internal
difficulties with this theory, the chief perhaps being that it does not
explain why individuals own their labor in the first instance or why
they are entitled to receive the full value
of the improved property
53
instead of the incremental value thereof.
In place of the labor theory of property, it is possible to develop an
alternative justification for the first possession rule, one which deals
more with problems of social coordination and less with a natural
theory of desert. By this alternative conception, the distribution of
property rights in the original position is a functional question, forward-looking in orientation, in which the central task is to develop
that initial distribution of rights that leads to the shortest path for the
productive use of natural resources-that is, to some form of allocative efficiency. 4 Under this theory, individuals have sole ownership
of their labor because that assignment of rights facilitates
market
55
alternative.
any
than
better
far
labor
in
transactions
49 See INS, 248 U.S. at 234-36.

50 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 133-46 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (6th ed.
1764).
51 Id. at 134.
52 For various views on the labor theory of value, see Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights:
Philosophic Foundations 32-57 (1977); C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Progressive
Individualism 194-221 (1962); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 254-92 (1990).

53 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221,
1225-30 (1979) (discussing shortcomings of the labor theory of property rights).
54 See Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 17, 26-28 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein,
Luck]; Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub.

Pol'y 713, 730-37 (1989) [hereinafter Epstein, Utilitarian Foundations].
55 See Epstein, Luck, supra note 54, at 26-28; Epstein, Utilitarian Foundations, supra note
54, at 730-31.
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Whatever the precise theoretical justification of the common law,
the same results obtain once the initial premises of individual selfownership and private property acquired through possession (or
labor) are accepted.5 6 In either case, individuals own both their labor
and the property acquired with it. Usually, protecting the property
itself, whether by actions of trespass or conversion, is sufficient to protect the labor invested in its improvement, without any independent
action. The common law, therefore, essentially adopts the libertarian
view, which protects property rights against the aggression of strangers and allows the recombination of property rights through voluntary exchanges7 that may be repeated as often as the owners of
5
resources like.

B. Property Rights in News
The first question that faced the justices in INS was whether this
classical common law model of property or the common law doctrines of contract and tort could resolve the case. In order to understand how these common law theories influenced the opinions in INS,
it is important to note those portions of the case that were uncontroversial and, therefore, not before the Supreme Court. These fall
into two classes: misrepresentation, or "passing off," as a species of
unfair competition, and inducement of breach of contract.
1. Misrepresentationand Passing Off
The first possible approach to INS is to ask whether the AP could
have obtained its injunction by relying on the normal tort theories of
misrepresentation. The answer is, probably not. The usual case of
misrepresentation involves a false statement by the defendant to the
plaintiff or to a third party that induces some action to the plaintiff's
detriment. In INS, the INS made no misrepresentations to the AP, so
everything turns on the misrepresentations, if any, that the INS made
to third parties. That issue is captured at common law, for example,
in the tort of passing off, the gist of which is that the defendant claims
that the goods he sells are the (superior) goods of the plaintiff. This
56 See Baird, supra note 45, at 423.

57 There is a close connection between this critical component of a common law theory and
the "historical" theories of justice (that is in acquisition, protection, and transfer) that Robert
Nozick subsequently developed with great elegance and ingenuity.

Anarchy, State, and Utopia 149-82 (1974).
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case presents a variation on a familiar theme in that the INS lifted
stories from the AP wire without disclosing the source of its information. Many INS subscribers may have been unwilling to take or to
use the bulletins had they known how the INS had acquired them.
There are two objections to this theory on the facts of INS. The
first, pressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent, is that silence as to
source should not be treated as though it were an affirmative representation, absent any clear duty to disclose."8 The second, pressed by
Justice Holmes, is that even if silence counted as improper concealment given the course of dealing, the AP was not entitled to the
sweeping injunctive relief the courts awarded, which enjoined the INS
from using news bulletins and stories lifted from AP sources.5 9 As
Holmes put it in his concurrence: "[A]s, in my view, the only ground
of complaint that can be recognized without legislation is the implied
misstatement, it can be corrected by stating the truth; and a suitable
acknowledgment of the source is all that the plaintiff can require."0
Consequently, the misrepresentation theories, standing alone, could
not get the AP the relief it sought.
2. Inducement of Breach of Contract
The shortcomings with the passing-off theory bring us to inducement of breach of contract, the second common law theory that influenced the result in INS. As Judge Hand summarized the first two
allegations, they faulted the INS for "[a]rranging with employes of
members of the Associated Press to furnish its news to the defendant
for a consideration [read: bribe] before publication" and "inducing
[AP] members to violate [AP's] by-laws and permit defendant to
obtain news of the Associated Press before publication. '61 Hand
enjoined these practices largely because they fell within the common
law rule that inducement of breach of contract is a tort. 62 The application of the rule makes good sense in this case because it makes it
clear that no one can knowingly take information from which he has
58 See INS, 248 U.S. at 260 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In so arguing, Brandeis takes a

strongly libertarian view of the common law of unfair competition.
59 Id. at 247-48 (Holmes, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 248 (Holmes, J., concurring).
61 Associated PressI, 240 F. at 985.
62 Id. at 985-88.
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been lawfully excluded. 63 That we deal here with the passage of information, instead of the services of an opera star,64 or workers involved
in a labor dispute,65 is quite immaterial. What matters is that the tort
applies to cases where the defendant acts with knowledge of the plaintiff's relationship to the third party, in order to induce the third party
to sell to him what has been promised exclusively to another.
The critical question is how far the remedy for the tort goes. At
one level, that is a function of the contracts in question that are to be
breached. Historically, the most relevant Supreme Court authority
66
on this point was Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.
There the defendants were traders in grain who sought to use the
quotations generated by the Chicago Board of Trade, even though
they were not members of the organization. In order for them to do
so, they had received the information from subscribers to the Board of
Trade's service, who had received the information from the Board of
Trade under an agreement that they would use the information in
confidence (that is, would not pass it on to anyone outside the circle of
subscribers). The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes,
enjoined the defendants' use of the information on the ground that the
Board of Trade
does not lose its rights by communicating the result [the grain quotations] to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to itself,
under a contract not to make it public, and strangers to the trust will
be restrained from getting at the knowledge by inducing a breach of
trust and using knowledge obtained by such a breach.67
In essence, the confidential relation cases rely on the common law tort
of inducement of breach of contract, which works because the information was disseminated only to individuals who took the information impressed with the limitation on its use.
63 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of
Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1987) (comparing inducement of breach of contract
to cases where a purchaser is willing to buy from a thief or faithless bailee property known to
belong to a third party).
64 See Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
65 See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). Ironically, Justice
Pitney wrote the opinion in Hitchman Coal over a Brandeis dissent. My support of Pitney's
position in Hitchman Coal is set out at length in Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357 (1983).
66 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
67 Id. at 250-51.
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The question in INS was whether it is possible in principle to go
beyond the confidential relation cases. In dealing with the issue,
Judge Hand wrote: "In the stock and grain quotation decisions the
right has been likened to a trade secret. But in all these cases there is
little basis for anything like secrecy, and there is often no real contract
not to disclose what is published."68 This view of the situation seems
at odds with Holmes' more limited statement in the Christiedecision,
and it makes INS easy for the AP as a matter of precedent because it
assumes that the protection afforded in the prior quotation cases had
to rest on a limited property right in information-that is, to the quotations-that existed apart from contract.
On this point at least, however, Justice Brandeis is surely correct in
his INS dissent when he notes that a network of contracts is as good as
a single bilateral connection so long as there are no gaps in the
chain. 9 The relief provided in Christiedoes look like the contractual
protection afforded trade secrets and not the protection normally created by systems of property rights, such as the patent law. At first
blush, the radical and principled difference between Christie and INS
is that publication to the world is not the same as publication to a
limited audience, so that the tort theory of inducement of breach of
contract is inapplicable in INS.7' As both traditional tort theories
fail, it looks as though the AP should be without a remedy.
3. Property, or Quasi-Property,in News
Justice Pitney does not rely on either the misrepresentation or
inducement of breach of contract cases to make the whole of his argument in INS. Instead, he rests upon the idea of property rights in
news. To set the stage for his argument, Pitney outlines the relevant
questions as follows:
1. Whether there is any property in news; 2. Whether, if there be
property in news collected for the purpose of being published, it survives the instant of its publication in the first newspaper to which it is
communicated by the news-gatherer; and 3. Whether defendant's
admitted course of conduct in appropriating for commercial use mat68 Associated Press 1, 240 F. at 992 (citation omitted).
69 INS, 248 U.S. at 251-53 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70 Judge Hough drew this distinction in his opinion for
"

the Second Circuit in Associated
Press 1 ,245 F. at 250, arguing that there was no publication until all publications had been
made, a point that seems wrong as a matter of description.

HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev. 112 1992

PropertyRights in News

1992]

ter taken from bulletins or early editions of Associated Press publications constitutes unfair competition in trade.7 1

Pitney answers all three questions in the affirmative, as he must in
order to hold for the plaintiff, but there are some evident difficulties in
his analysis. First, consider the mode of acquisition. In the normal
case, property in external things is acquired by taking first possession
of them. But what is it that is possessed here? Surely it cannot be the
right to be the sole person to speak about the event, which is news
itself. Those events are open for all to see and to analyze as they see
fit, and the fact that one company decides to send its team of reporters
to investigate a story does not preclude others from following suit.
Indeed, the thought that only persons who deal with the AP can
speak of Pearl Harbor after it breaks the story, for example, is too
grotesque to admit any serious consideration. The social loss, the
giant-size externality of massive ignorance, that would result from the
creation of so extensive a property right is too large to deny.
On the other side, no holdout problems arise by allowing multiple
parties to gain access to the same public events. Quite the opposite,
having many separate parties cover the same event only serves to
increase the options available to consumers and to mitigate the harmful effects of monopoly. In this context, the twin concerns with externalities and holdouts (which drive the rules on property generally) are
not in opposition to each other, but cut in the same direction, so that
the resulting system of property rights clearly favors socialization.
Pitney himself adheres to this line: "the news element-the information respecting current events contained in the literary production-is
not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily
arepublicijuris;it is the history of the day. ' ' 72 In other words, there
are no property rights in historical events.
The fear of giving the first newspaper to report on an event the
exclusive right of coverage, however, does not undermine the case for
recognizing property rights in the stories about the historical events.
But even if so confined, property rights in tangibles acquired at common law under the first possession rule usually possess two key characteristics. First, they are good against the rest of the world, and
second, they are of infinite duration. Neither of those conditions is
71INS, 248 U.S. at 232.
72 Id. at 234.
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satisfied with a property right in news. The tipoff that something is
slightly amiss is verbal: Pitney describes the defendant's interest in its
news as "quasi property," which is good only for a short period of
time (less than a day) and then only against the direct competitor of
the plaintiff:
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both
parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same
field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as
between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of
the rights of either as against the public.73

There are good reasons to have strong property rights in tangibles
and weaker ones in news stories, for, as Professor Douglas Baird has
noted, there are important differences and similarities between land
and information. 74 With land, the first possession rule assigns ownership rights to the first taker. In so doing, the rule imposes two kinds
of costs: first, it induces persons to take possession of the land prematurely, before they need it for use and production, and second, it
imposes losses on those who do not win in the early chase. The justifications for the fist possession rule are that it avoids the endless
holdout problems over the disposition of resources and sets up decentralized systems of property rights that facilitate the organization of a
market.75 Once someone obtains these property rights, however, it
makes sense that they be of infinite duration (that is, held in fee simple). Any shorter interest would raise the question of who will possess at the expiration of the term and make it more costly for the
original owner to make valuable improvements to the property, if
some of the benefits will inure to some new taker of the land in question. Because ordinarily only one person can use a piece of land efficiently at any given time, giving the ownership in fee does not cut out
subsequent deployment. Exclusivity in perpetuity, therefore, comes at
a very low price for land.
Information, as an intangible, raises very different problems. Here
there is a need to spur the creation of the property in question, which
is perhaps analogous to the need for spurring the discovery of valua73 Id. at 236.

See Baird, supra note 45, at 413-14.
See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 669-70 (1986); see also Epstein, Luck, supra note 54, at 26-28
(same); Epstein, Utilitarian Foundations, supra note 54, at 730-37 (same).
74
75
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ble land, such as land containing valuable mineral rights. But once
the property is effectively developed, the information may well have
greater value if it is used by many people simultaneously than if it is
used and kept by one person alone (a new mathematical theorem may
be a good illustration of this phenomenon). Therefore, granting perpetual property rights in information creates, at the margin, small
additional incentives to gather the information, but it reduces, no
doubt to a far greater extent, the beneficial use of the information
once it is made available.
News differs from other forms of information in which property
rights are created. With news, the economic return obtained by the
newspaper is concentrated very highly in the first period after its use,
usually within twenty-four hours or less. A system that grants property rights for that limited time is apt to create powerful incentives for
the collection of news and to make the information widely available
thereafter without costly transactions between the countless users of
the information and the many suppliers of that information, each of
whom has, or may claim to have, provided some fraction of it. It is a
transactional nightmare to assume that all researchers and analysts
who read both INS and AP papers will be barraged with claims for
restitution for value provided. The system of property works quite
well if the news services can keep their exclusive rights relative to
each other for a short period of time, which is what the Pitney rule
did.
The basic point can be made forcefully in cost/benefit terms. The
tradeoff between acquisition ex ante and utilization ex post is quite
different for news than it is for chattels. In the latter case, there is no
social loss from having the exclusive property rights of the first possessor retained in perpetuity. With agricultural land, only one person
can efficiently reap the crops after they have been sown. A free-for-all
on harvest would be destructive of the entire system of agriculture. It
follows that the tradeoff between the creation of valuable resources
and their maximal utilization simply does not arise with land. The
system of perpetual exclusive ownership of land maximizes the value
of that sort of resource. That system, however, is flawed for
intangibles such as news, where multiple use, given its initial creation,
increases overall value. Given the differences in the utilization patterns of tangibles and intangibles, Pitney's cautious characterization
of the right in news represents an intelligent response to the tradeoffs
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in question. The cost/benefit analysis and the custom thus track each
other well.
In this regard, moreover, there is a strong difference between the
protection that is provided to news as quasi-property and that which
is provided to copyrights, another form of intangible with quite different characteristics. At one level, ordinary copyright protection is
insufficient in the short run because a rewrite of the news story does
not offend copyright, although it results in the misappropriation of
the AP's effort to collect the information for the story. Yet, in
another sense, copyright protection is overbroad, for the optimal
length of copyright protection, always measured in years, is wildly
excessive for news. The individual story, as opposed to the information that it contains, is something that can vest for long periods of
time in one person without impeding the ability of others to do their
work. Because the payoff from a book or a story is not heavily concentrated in the first twenty-four hours of its publication, longer periods of protection are normally required to generate the promised
return that will induce the labor in the first place.76 Pitney is quite
right to assume that one can deal with the special rules governing
news without having to call into question the separate protection,
afforded for very different periods of time, for copyright.7 The great
irony is that Brandeis, whose seminal article on privacy celebrated the
capacity of the common law to grow in response to new issues, 78 was
willing to dump the issue of the creation of property rights in news
back into the lap of Congress, which had failed to pass such a statute
a few years before INS was decided.79
In making these elaborate calculations, it is clear that Pitney does
not expressly rely upon the customary practices within the industry to
76 The present law sets the period of copyright protection at life plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(e) (1988). It does not set it for a period ofX years after publication, perhaps on the view
that it is easier to determine the date of death than it is the date of publication. The result, of
course, is that works written by young authors with long life expectancies receive greater
protection, in terms of years, than is received by old authors who, by definition, have much
shorter life expectancies. For a discussion of the optimal length of copyright protection, see
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.

Legal Stud. 325, 361-63 (1989).
77 See INS, 248 U.S. at 234-36.
78 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
79 INS, 248 U.S. at 264-65 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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account for the result in the case. Yet he manages to produce, by
diverging at the two critical junctures from the standard conception
of common law rights, the very same distribution of outcomes that
would have been achieved if he had simply decided that custom
within the industry set up the property rights as between industry
competitors. The industry norm made no effort to charge end users
anything more than the cost of the newspaper or to stop the use of
tips by competitors, but did prohibit the lifting of stories from bulletin
boards and early editions of papers.8 0 That, in essence, is Pitney's
position.
The weakness of Brandeis' and Holmes' positions was that they
stayed too closely wedded to common law conceptions of force and
fraud, too close to the standard forms of property rights in chattels
and writings. At no point did they see those rules as means to achieve
some overall conception of social welfare. To be sure, in the normal
case the protection of labor is well-achieved by rules that protect the
fruits of labor-rules that allow one to reap what one has sown"1 and
preserve the sanctity of contract. But here the labor, skill, and money
invested by the defendant created information that was not embodied
in any tangible thing, so some deviation from the common law conceptions had to be made in order to achieve higher levels of social
output, shared by all, from a given set of scarce resources. The risk of
seeking out the immutable rules of positive law is that, had the composition of the Supreme Court been different, the three dissenting
voices in INS 2 would have established the legal norms for an industry whose internal operation they scarcely understood.
4. The Necessity Exception
Although Pitney reached the correct result in INS, there are limits
to his success as well. At no point in his opinion did he seek to take
into account the effects of having the INS cut off from news from the

80

See supra note 24.
81 Justice Pitney uses the reap-what-you-sow metaphor to support the result in INS. See
infra text accompanying note 92. The proposition makes great sense in agriculture, where it is

more than a metaphor, for it captures the idea that no one will plant if others can harvest one's
crops, thus showing the instrumental justification for exclusive property rights in land.
82 Holmes was joined in his partial concurrence by Justice Joseph McKenna. Because he

agreed with Brandeis on the main issue, the vote in the case was 5-3. Justice John Clarke did
not participate.

HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev. 117 1992

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 78:85

European theater. That change in events, as noted above, radically
altered the game for all parties, and the question is whether those
changes should have been reflected in the law. Here there is, moreover, ample reason to believe that some adjustment was appropriate.
Even though the ordinary common law rules of private property
allow for the absolute exclusion of others from land possessed by the
owner, it long has been understood that these rules may be suspended
in cases of necessity. A person stranded at sea, for example, may use
force against an owner to reach a position of safety, even if he has to
compensate the owner for any damage to the property. 3 The basic
intuition behind these necessity cases is a sound one. In necessity
cases, a system of absolute and exclusive property rights that normally promotes industry and trade imposes incredible bargaining and
holdout problems in situations where the (next best) value in use of
the land to an owner is a tiny fraction of the value of the use of that
land to a person in peril of his life. 4
The exact contours of the necessity doctrine are beyond the scope
of this Article, but its implications are relevant to one central question: What happens when customary practices, based on a norm of
equal and open access, are transformed in an environment where a
foreign government excludes some persons? Does necessity allow the
information to be taken from the other, but (and here is the rub) only
on payment of just compensation, as when land is taken or used in
circumstances of necessity? Should, in other words, the INS unilaterally have been able to avail itself of AP stories for some fraction of
AP's cost of producing them-the relevant just compensation-until
it was able to reestablish itself in the market?
This alternative is not without its costs, especially if it invites direct
bargaining between the two organizations. If the AP and the INS
wanted to combine their operations generally, there would be some
question as to whether the combination (viewed either at the member
or the entity level) would be an illegal restraint on trade of the sort
prohibited by the Sherman Act. 5 Yet another problem cannot be
ignored: If the two sides did bargain with each other, and the British
83 See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); Ploofv. Putnam,
71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). For a short account of the role of necessity more generally, see Richard
A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 2 (1990).
84 See cases cited supra note 83.
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
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and French governments got wind of the situation, then they might
have banned the AP as well. But, because they did not tie the legal
rules back to the customary practices and institutional framework
from which they derived, the litigants overlooked the very possibility
that (for a mouthful) ostensibly absolute quasi-property rights should
be defeasible in cases of necessity. And it seems a pity, for, on the
merits, recognizing a necessity exception appears to be the right
approach, which, if taken from the outset, could have saved a lot of
confusion and uncertainty.
5. A Reprieve for Contract?
The analysis thus far has worked from the common assumption
shared by all the Justices in INS, namely, that the common law
framework of property, contract, and tort, as enforced by the action
against inducement of breach of contract, cannot give the AP the
injunctive remedy it sought. But there is some difficulty in deciding
whether this assumption would hold if the AP had adopted the most
aggressive contractual strategy available.
Take, by way of counterexample, the following modification of the
basic pattern: When the AP posts its news dispatches on the bulletin
boards, it does so under a broad statement that says: "These bulletins
are posted for the sole benefit of our subscribing companies. No other
person who reads this information is entitled to use or to transfer it to
any other person for commercial reproduction. ' '8 6 Similarly, when
the AP sends its bulletins to its eastern papers, they all publish it
under legends that proclaim that "the news contained herein is for the
sole benefit of our subscribers and may not be reproduced for commercial use without the express written consent of the AP." Here
there is no question that the INS, as a professional gatherer of news,
could not claim that it took the news free of the restriction because it
lacked notice of its contents or purpose. The only question is whether
the restriction in question is one that would bind persons taking the
information with knowledge of the restriction.
86 A parallel to the limitations on the broadcasts of the Chicago Cubs' games is evident.
Whenever Steve Stone, the Cubs' excellent color man, informs viewers that "any use or
rebroadcast of the descriptions or accounts of this game without the express written consent of
the Cubs is definitely prohibited," the accent is on the "definitely," so we know that he means
business, as do the Cubs.
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Why not? The case is surely one that differs vastly from a similar
declaration that says "all persons who use the public highways do so
on notice from the defendant that he will be driving his car in a reckless and irresponsible fashion," or from the case where the owner of
land tells his neighbor "build your house at your own risk because I'm
about to blast on my land." The difference is that in these last two
cases, there is in place a well-designed system of property rights that
allows a person to use the road and to have the protection of the tort
law, or to use her land and have the protection of the tort law. What
the defendant seeks to do in each instance is to force the plaintiff to
choose between two entitlements, each of which is fully protected.
These "duress of goods" cases are like choosing between
your money
7
and your life when you are entitled to have both.1
But the cases are distinguishable. Although notice functions sometimes to defeat rights, in other contexts it fumctions to preserve them.
The notice given in the above hypothetical about newspapers falls into
this second class. It serves a useful social function, just as it does
when strangers to the title receive notice that the bailee does not own
property, and just as it does when a well-run recordation system
affords notice to prospective purchasers of land. The recipient of the
information had no right to get the information before it was placed
on the bulletin boards or in the newspapers, and now he is told definitively that he can receive it only if he takes it subject to conditions.
The conditions themselves hardly can be regarded as exploitative
given that they prevent the type of degenerative social equilibrium
that Judge Grosscup described so vividly."8
One simple way of looking at INS is as a question of what default
terms of the contract should be imposed when the information is
posted and published without the appropriate disclaimers. Because
the express restriction works well, why not imply it as a matter of
course and leave it to the AP to remove it if it so chooses? Or why
not at least state that the restriction, if announced, would be respected
87 For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L.
& Econ. 293 (1975). Roughly analogous is the choice to which a landowner is put when the
government gives notice of possible future plans to condemn the property in order to limit the
development of property rights without compensation, a strategy I have attacked on
constitutional grounds in Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of

Eminent Domain 77-80 (1985).
88 See supra text accompanying note 28.
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and enforced as against direct competitors8 9 under the Christie principle? This contract approach would avoid some of the odd features of
the quasi-property analysis to which Pitney resorts. Intelligent contracting with default notice rules would create the same outcome that
he achieved: using the information implies acceptance of the contract
subject to the conditions created, much like use of the immortal carbolic smoke ball with notice of the promise to pay created a contract
without a formal return acceptance.' °
Yet here, too, the contract analysis cannot be pushed too far, at
least if we recognize any antitrust-like limitations on freedom of contract. Suppose, for example, that the information in the newspaper is
published with a warning: "Any person who uses the information
acquired in this paper in order to make its own business plans shall
remit to this paper a sum equal to one percent of the profits made
from such a venture." Could anyone enforce a clause of this sort? At
one level, the answer is that the wrong question is being asked. The
right inquiry is whether any newspaper would seek to impose that
clause in question, knowing that it would be subject to a torrent of
abuse for deviating from the customary rules on the matter and to
massive defections to other publications that still are willing to live by
the traditional rules.
But it is risky to rely too much on the "it won't happen so why
worry about the question" analysis, for surely there are other cases in
which this argument loses its punch. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones &
Co. 91 is such a case. The Dow Jones Company publishes its famous
Dow Jones average on a daily basis. If it included in its publication a
statement that said "no recipient of the information may use it to
create a stock index future contract," it would be able to preserve its
89 There are more serious problems when the information is used in a follow-on sense, and
in that context, the notice of an intent to exclude seems to make sense as a transaction costminimization device, given that there is a single producer of the information and a large
number of possible users who would find it costly to inquire on their own initiative.
90 See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1892) (treating the need to respond as
having been waived by the offeror). Here there is this difference: the notice imposes
restrictions that become part of the offer that is accepted, or, in the alternative, limits the class
of persons to whom the offer (or transfer) of information is made, so that it can no longer be
described as an offer to all the world. It is an offer only to the parties who are willing to abide
by the conditions on use. For an exhaustive account of the case, see A.W.B. Simpson,
Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball, 14 J. Legal Stud. 345
(1985).
91 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983).
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traditional market, for the vast bulk of persons who use the index do
so for other purposes; indeed, the restriction would exclude no use
tolerated under the status quo ante. The question of whether a contractual clause of this sort should be enforceable raises the same general question that the follow-on cases after INS present, namely, does
the quasi-property right in news extend to controversies over news
(which has a very short useful life) between non-competing firms?
In part, Pitney anticipated this problem. Although he said in very
broad terms that the property right in news was created to insure that
the INS could not appropriate the labor, skill, and money of the AP
by "endeavoring to reap where it has not sown," 92 he was very careful
to hem in that broad statement by drawing the distinction between
"the right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge
of its contents gratuitously" and the practice of the INS to sell that
same knowledge "in competition with" the defendant.93 He was
doubtless well-aware of the fact that all sorts of people use information they read and would not have questioned that one of the essential
conditions of living in a free and prosperous society is the freedom to
use information (if not grain) sown by others. 94 The creation of private property rights in information would allow large numbers of persons to block the use of valuable information by others. In light of
that obvious peril, it would be a giant mistake to assume that the only
objective of the law in the area of property rights is to prevent free
riding by others. Some considerable degree of free riding is necessary
to avoid the endless problems of hold-out and blockade.
Nonetheless, although Pitney was conscious of the limitations of
the reap-and-sow maxim, his identification of the two polar situations-direct competition and casual use-skipped over the situation
in Dow Jones, where the defendant makes follow-on use of the plaintiff's index for commercial gain in a market different from (if related
92

INS, 248 U.S. at 239.

93 Id.

94 As Professor Baird has written on this point:

That information once published should be presumptively free for all to use is a
commonplace of intellectual property law. As Benjamin Kaplan has observed, "if man
has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to
reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and
'progress,' if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying."
Baird, supra note 45, at 411 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 2
(1966)).
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to) that in which the plaintiff has earned its keep.95 In working
through this intermediate case, it is far from clear whether Dow Jones
should receive the property protection that it seeks, even if it publishes its index with an explicit contractual prohibition against any
future commercial use by a rival. In this case, arguments about property, custom, and contract tend to blend into a seamless but indistinct
web.
First, unlike INS, there is no set of reciprocal interactions in Dow
Jones that allows for the generation of any useful set of customary
norms. Within the INS context itself, there is good reason to believe
that the appropriation of the stories by the rival will lead to the
destruction of the market and that both parties adhere to the norm to
avoid the terrible consequences that otherwise would follow. 96 Pitney

could have followed the Hayekian approach and decided the case on
grounds of custom alone. That resolution surely is not possible in
Dow Jones. There, short of legal protection, Dow Jones can do nothing to retaliate against a party that uses its average as a basis for a
trading index because the parties stand in a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship to each other. Consequently, in Dow Jones, there
would not have been a stable custom on which to fashion a legal rule.
Second, by the same token, the social losses generated by not creating the property right on follow-on commercial uses seem fairly small,
but, however small, these losses are not zero. Everyone knows that
unanticipated benefits are worth having at least to some degree. Dow
Jones, which had sufficient incentive to produce the average before,
still has that incentive because there is no direct competition; there is,
therefore, nothing about the creation of this novel futures contract
that diminishes the gains that Dow Jones gets from producing its
index. The only question is whether it will gain some form of a windfall profit from a use that it had not anticipated at the time it first
established its index. Denying it that right will reduce, at the margin,
the incentive for Dow Jones to create its index in the first place, but
the effect, ex ante, is apt to be very small because there is a long time
delay between the time that the index was invented and the time that
its secondary use became feasible. In this setting, creating the small
extra incentive to produce the index would mean that subsequent
95 Dow Jones, 456 N.E.2d at 86.
96 See supra text accompanying note 38.
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innovators in related markets have to transact with Dow Jones,
thereby creating high transaction costs and the risk of monopoly in
some new product market.
Third, on the other side, it may well be that some negative "halo
effect" will reduce the value of the Dow Jones index in its primary
market, so that it will be left worse off if others can trade on its name.
In what has to be regarded as an exceedingly close case, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Dow Jones gave the property right in the Dow
Jones futures contract to the company and thus barred the Board of
Trade from trading its new index, noting that other indices were
available for trading.9 7 In essence, it decided that Dow Jones should
be granted a property right because the monopoly risk is small. It
may well have been influenced by the fact that Dow Jones refused to
take hard cash for a license to use the name, 98 which could be interpreted as evidence that Dow Jones did value the exclusive use highly
and feared the negative halo effect.
In sum, cases like Dow Jones present a quandary for modem legal
theory. There is no clear custom bearing on the formation of property
rights, and no analytical approach that fills the gap. All that one can
say is that we are fortunate indeed that the breakdown in legal theory
comes at the point where the social consequences of alternative legal
regimes are so closely balanced.
IV.

THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN DEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS

Having examined the theoretical debate concerning the origin of
property rights, the INS decision, and subsequent cases, we return to
the question with which this Article began: What is the relationship of
custom, law, and property? As the discussion thus far indicates, the
INS decision and the cases following it reached results consistent with
the custom of the news-gathering industry, although they did not purport to derive their rules from custom. This congruence raises two
conceptual problems that require brief comment.
A.

Custom or Cost/Benefit Analysis: A Reprise

The first is the question of technique: In dealing with the creation
and recognition of property rights, should courts or legislatures refer
97
98

Dow Jones, 456 N.E.2d at 89-90.
See id.
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to custom or should they invoke general principles of positive law?
Where they do the former, their task is essentially reflective, to find
out the normative rules on which parties organize their social interaction.9 9 INS comes out the way it does because all parties to the industry acknowledged the basic property rights in news and the "tip"
exception to it.
The opposite view, which asks judges and legislators to make positive law on property, requires them to confront first principles more
directly.Y00 Although they may and will make an occasional bow to
the sovereign power of natural law, typically those bland pronouncements (which can, depending on the predisposition of the lawmaker,
support either A's natural right to use or B's to exclude) will dissolve
into a closer examination of the advantages and disadvantages of
alternative legal rules, measured in terms of the total social satisfaction they generate. Judges and legislatures will act, therefore, as some
imprecise form of social maximizers and inventors, as did Pitney in
predicting the decline of the news agencies if pirating were allowed.
There is peril in both these courses of action. To use the social
utilitarian calculus is a risky thing, and the failure to take into
account certain relevant effects may lead to the adoption of the wrong
legal rule. Indeed, the power of Hayek's own formal and rational
analysis of legal norms rests in his compelling demonstration that customary rules and practices do work well, even if for reasons that the
parties governed by those practices often do not understand and cannot fully articulate. In advocating reliance on custom instead of
abstract reasoning in creating property rights, Hayek is the antithesis
of the Socratic philosopher. Nonetheless, Hayek has made rational
argument, of the type he is suspicious of, for relying on customary
rules.1"1 But when all is said and done, there still are cases where
custom will
fail as well, as the above discussion of Dow Jones
02
reveals. 1

As a result, the relative desirability of the two methodologies
depends upon the comparative magnitude of their imperfections. In a
world in which analysts were perfectly skilled in what they do, custom could be dispensed with as a way station along the road to the
99 See supra text accompanying note 3.

100 See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
101See, e.g., Gray, supra note 8.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
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optimal collective delineation of property rights. As long as
lawmakers are plagued with imperfect knowledge, however, the institutional dominance of analytical methods always will remain contestable. The best that can be said is that custom is deep, and works well
in narrow domains, while cost/benefit analysis has greater range but
weaker reliability.
Accordingly, custom should be followed in those cases in which
there are repeat and reciprocal interactions between the same parties,
for then their incentives to reach the correct rule are exceedingly powerful. Because the parties operate perforce under a veil of ignorance,
they will have every incentive incrementally to find the best set of
accommodations to advance their joint welfare. So long as general
constraints, such as the credible threat of retaliation for opportunistic
conduct, are imposed upon future behavior, the only way that the
individual can maximize his own self-interest is to seek the rule that
advances the interest of the group as a whole. In a word, custom
works well for direct competition, but not so well for follow-on cases.
In those domains where custom is weak, however, some explicit
cost/benefit calculation has to be made. Here, the more lawmakers
know about how individual rationality can either advance or subvert
collective welfare, the better able they will be to pick that rule that
works in the long run. It would be a mistake, now that the genie of
transaction cost analysis is out of the bottle, to assume that we should
spurn basic knowledge of how legal systems and institutions work
because lawmakers might misapply that knowledge. Better it is to
array the full set of relevant considerations (including those that
relate to the limitations of knowledge) in support of the optimal legal
rule. In so doing, freedom of contract between consenting parties and
limited government comes out quite well, just as Hayek believed. If
custom had universal domains and if analysts had unerring intellectual power, the two would agree on all outcomes, just as they do on
the narrow issue of direct competition presented in INS. But in an
imperfect world, it cannot be said that methods of rational deduction
are necessarily inferior to customary methods. There is some division
of their relative attractiveness along the lines noted above, which is
why the tension of methodologies in the law shall persist over time.
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B From Industry to Government
The second point concerns the extent to which one can generalize
from the emergence of customary practices within an industry to the
emergence of customary rules that govern the operation of societies
writ large. Even if one concludes, as seems proper, that customary
norms could have decided INS, it does not follow that custom lays the
groundwork for society at large.10 3 Indeed, one conspicuous counterexample to the dominance of customary norms is The FederalistNo.
1, where Alexander Hamilton notes expressly that the question of
governance reduces to the "question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection
and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force."'' 4 And our original
Constitution could not have been designed by custom, even if it has
been radically undermined by judicial decisions. To be sure, custom
still has an enormous attractiveness to the extent that the customary
rules are those identified by Hume a long time ago: protect property
from aggression and insure the enforcement of contracts between parties. 0 5 Even where customary rules do have broad application, it cannot be assumed as a matter of course that their enforcement can be left
to customary sanctions. INS again hints at the lesson: the mutual
limitations on pirating news did not survive the British and French
ban of the INS.
More generally, decentralized customs may be generated without
legal interference and control, but legal force may be necessary to
maintain them against systematic defection. Indeed, the entire debate
over whether some level of coercion is required first to form, and then
to maintain, the state rests in part upon the common (dare one say
customary) perception that purely private agreements wil break
down in the face of opportunistic behavior. That argument is not
overcome by showing that customs in particular trades or industries
have proved stable without government support. In many instances,
these customs were able to form only because the government had
supplied industry with the essential protection against external
103 Hayek, therefore, may be fairly charged with a bit of excessive optimism in the
assumption that the spontaneous order that emerges in given trades can emerge for entire
societies. See sources cited supra note 8 for Hayek on spontaneous order.
104 See The Federalist No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
105See Hume, supra note 7, at 501-25.
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aggression that it needed to survive and flourish. The role of custom
as a source of incremental improvement where order is secured by
collective government does not imply that custom itself can be the
source of the initial political order that allows those incremental
improvements to emerge. In other words, what works as a protected
mechanism within a limited sphere may not work as an unprotected
one in an unbounded domain.
CONCLUSION

Economists long have said that there are distinct perils in trying to
draw general equilibrium conclusions from partial equilibrium models. Lawyers who look at the role of custom cannot afford to forget
that lesson, whether dealing with the origins of intellectual property
rights, or, for that matter, anything else. They also should learn that
customs and industry practices within partial equilibrium settings
often have a durability that our own techniques of rational analysis
can achieve only imperfectly. All these lessons are, I think, implicit
in INS, which is why it will remain one of the enduring monuments of
the common law.
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